Abstract
Executive Summary
This study focuses on access to housing credit by the low-income population. The main objective is to determine the role of housing subsidies and partial credit guarantees in access to mortgages by low-income households. Additionally, the study analyzes the impact of housing credit and subsidies on the quality of life and the quality of dwelling of their beneficiaries.
In Colombia, the housing deficit remains high (36.4 percent) and approximately 97 percent of the households facing this deficit belong to the lowest income segments. The housing deficit is mainly qualitative (23.8 percent), and the most widespread problem among the poorest families is lack of access to sewerage, followed by lack of access to proper drinking water networks. This situation is associated with low levels of housing finance. The mortgage portfolio in Colombia amounts to around 3 percent of GDP, while the Latin American average is close to 5 percent.
The literature on housing finance in Colombia suggests that the main obstacles to increasing access to housing loans are related to low income, lack of information on borrowers' ability to pay, high costs of recovering collateral, mortgage interest rate rigidities, and judicial insecurity.
The main policy instruments addressing these obstacles are low-income housing subsidies and partial credit guarantees. The low-income housing subsidy, created in 1991, has been one of the main instruments of the low-income housing policy. It is a one-time direct subsidy to partially fund the purchase of affordable housing. The partial credit guarantees to low-income housing loans, implemented in 2004, address the obstacles of lack of collateral and costly collateral recovery.
In this paper the beneficiaries of both housing subsidies and credit are characterized using data from the Quality of Life Surveys from 2003 and 2008 (QLS) . From 2003 to 2008, the percentage of subsidy beneficiaries belonging to the three lowest income quintiles increased from 65 percent to 80 percent. However, in 2008 only a third of the subsidy beneficiaries were classified as poor according to the Index of Unmet Basic Needs (UBN). Credit access for the poorest segments of the population is even more difficult. More than 60 percent of the holders of housing loans belong to the two highest income quintiles, and only 11.8 percent are classified as poor by the UBN.
The impact of housing subsidies and credit on the quality of dwelling and quality of life are estimated through the method of propensity score matching, using data from the QLS. The
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The housing deficit in Colombia remains high (36.2 percent 1 Housing finance in Colombia is small compared to Latin American standards. Mortgage loans ranged from 3.0 percent to 3.5 percent of GDP during the last five years, while the regional average is around 5 percent.
) despite the recovery of the sector after the crisis of the late 1990s. The literature suggests that formal housing in Colombia is constrained, among other factors, by land markets failures, lengthy and costly procedures for obtaining building permits, and low access to credit. The Colombian literature has identified two main constraints to access to credit, especially by low-income people. First, even though poor families usually manage to accumulate a significant amount of capital over the years by participating in self-help housing construction, they may not have access to credit because loan providers perceive a high risk of default from borrowers with low and volatile incomes (Galindo and Lora, 2005) . In the same vein, Galindo and Hofstetter (2006) found that at the microeconomic level, interest rates are high due to the high credit risk assumed by lenders. Second, the supply of low-income housing credit is also constrained by the lack of collateral owing to deficiencies in deed registration and the high costs and length of time needed to recover collateral (Cárdenas and Badel, 2003) .
The problem of labor informality, which reaches almost 65 percent in Colombia, is behind the housing deficit and the lack of credit, because standard financial instruments do not suit the particular needs of this population. 1 According to the National Department of Statistics (DANE), in 1993 the effective housing deficit was 53.7 percent, dropping to 36.2 percent in 2005. 2 Warnock and Warnock (2008) . 3 "Ciudades Amables" in National Planning Department (2005) . 4 Rocha, Sánchez, and Tovar (2007) , estimate that a formal employee has a higher probability of accessing housing credit than an informal employee.
To promote the provision of low-income housing in Colombia, the government has implemented a number of instruments, including tax exemptions, partial credit guarantees, direct subsidies, and rediscount credits. However, the scope and effectiveness of these instruments have been limited. Access to housing by the poorest segments of the population is still significantly low. The program of subsidies for low-income housing, which provides direct, one-time subsidies to homebuyers, is the most important. The subsidy is expected to facilitate access to credit. Another instrument aimed at increasing access to credit is partial credit guarantee for lowincome housing credit, which addresses the obstacles related to lack of collateral and costly collateral recovery.
This study focuses on access to housing credit by the low-income population. Its main objective is to determine the impact of public policies designed to stimulate low-income housing.
Emphasis is placed on the effect of housing subsidies and partial credit guarantees on access to mortgages by low-income households and on the impact of subsidies on the quality of life and the quality of dwellings.
The document is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review of housing credit in Colombia. Section 3 illustrates the main features of the low-income housing market in Colombia, as well as further details of the program of housing subsidies. Section 4 focuses on the characteristics of housing policy instruments and regulation. Section 5 discusses the impact of subsidies and credit on the quality of life and the quality of housing. Section 6 provides a summary of the characteristics of the loan guarantee program and its effect on easing access to credit. Finally, the main conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
Literature Review
The housing sector in Colombia has been widely studied, with papers focusing on the mortgage markets and particularly on low-income housing finance. Rocha, Sánchez, and Tovar (2007) suggest that informality, low income and lack of information on borrower's ability to pay are the main barriers to access to credit by the lowincome population. According to the authors, the probability of getting a mortgage loan increases when households have been granted a subsidy, have high income, work in the formal sector, and have programmed savings accounts. They also point out that loan providers perceive that the income instability of informal workers leads to a high risk of nonpayment and, therefore, limit their exposure to this population. They recommend promoting appropriate mechanisms of information sharing, such as programmed savings, which signal the capacity of making regular payments to the financial system. Similarly, Murcia et al. (2007) use the Quality of Life Survey of 2003 to analyze the socioeconomic determinants of access to mortgage loans and credit cards and find that the probability of having a mortgage loan increases by 11.7 percent for households in the higher quintile of the income distribution. This probability also rises if the household has a housing subsidy or if it is located in an urban area. Cárdenas and Badel (2003) suggest that the high cost of recovering collateral and judicial insecurity work against access to credit in Colombia. They also point out that the financial crisis of the late 1990s in Colombia was a consequence of the drop in housing prices and a significant increase in the value of indebtedness by households, which deteriorated the loan-to-value ratio in the market.
According to Jaramillo and Cuervo (2009) , the interest rate ceiling for housing loans is a costly rigidity for the mortgage markets. Loan providers have low incentives to supply lowincome housing loans at the regulated rate, since these loans are risky and small and their administrative costs are high.
Among the studies focused on policy instruments for promoting the low-income housing market, Cuellar (2006) presents a thorough analysis of the evolution of the regulatory framework and its influence on the development of housing finance.
The National Planning Department of Colombia (2007) evaluates the Urban Low-Income Housing Subsidies Program. The evidence shows that assets ownership, education level, and access to information determine access to the program. According to this study, the program has a positive and significant impact on the house and neighborhood physical conditions, as well as on the beneficiary households' expenditure and savings. However, it does not estimate the effect of the subsidy on the access to housing finance.
Finally, Marulanda, Paredes, and Fajury (2006) calculate the fiscal cost of the partial credit guarantees on mortgages, as well as the fiscal cost of tax exemptions designed to promote low-income housing supply. The authors indicate that these policy instruments are dispersed and lack a results-based orientation, limiting their impact.
The Low-Income Housing Market in Colombia

Description of the Housing Deficit
The housing deficit in Colombia was 36.1 percent in 2005, of which 12.4 percent was quantitative-that is, the lack of housing-and 23.8 percent was qualitative-that is, living in inadequate housing.
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In regard to the quality of dwellings, among the poorest households the most widespread problem is the lack of access to sewerage: 61.8 percent of households in the first income quintile and 43.7 percent of households in the second income quintile do not have indoor plumbing. Next in importance is the lack of access to water networks: 40.4 percent and 28.8 percent, in the first and second income quintile respectively, lack this service (Table 1 ). In addition, according to information provided by QLS on flooring and wall materials, among the poorest households the most common materials are bricks and cement. However, as Table 1 also shows, some houses in the first income quintile are still built out of adobe, zinc, cloth, cardboard, and other disposable materials (6.2 percent) and have dirt floors (19.7 percent).
According to the Quality of Life Survey (QLS) of 2008, the housing deficit slightly decreased, to 34.6 percent (3.9 million households). Among these households, 68.0 percent belong to the first two income quintiles and their household heads are male (77.0 percent), with no education or only primary education (72.5 percent), are informal workers (78.0 percent) and live in cohabitation (45.8 percent).
Evolution of Housing Construction
During the last ten years construction of priority housing has increased, but the total low-income housing stock has decreased, especially in the recent economic downturn.
During the crisis of 1999, construction dropped to an annual average of 56,000 units, 43.4 percent below the figure observed in the early 1990s. This reduction was mainly due to the fall in non-low-income housing construction, which decreased from an average of 67,000 units in 1990-94 to 10,000 in 1998-2001, while low-income housing construction remained relatively constant and priority housing construction even rose from an average of 2,000 units to an average of 16,000 units. Construction of all types of housing recovered during the period 2002-05, reaching 5 The 2005 figure corresponds to the National Census published by DANE (National Department of Statistics in Colombia).
an average of 106,000 units. During the recent economic downturn, new construction projects declined to 71,000 units on average in 2008-09, due to the fall in low-income and priority housing construction, which fell by half. In contrast to the crisis of the 1990s, this time non-lowincome housing only decreased by 17 percent (see Figure 1) .
Figure 1. New Housing Units under Construction
Source: DANE (Construction Census, 2009) and Cuellar (2006) .
Main Characteristics of the Low-income Housing Mortgage Market
Housing finance in Colombia is small compared to other Latin American countries. Mortgage loans ranged from 2.9 percent to 3.2 percent of GDP during the last five years, while the regional average is around 5 percent. 6 Warnock and Warnock (2008) . 
Housing Policy Instruments and Regulation in Colombia
Subsidies
Background of Subsidy Programs
The Low-income Housing Subsidy was created in 1991 as the main instrument of a new demand-oriented low-income housing policy. Since its inception, the subsidy has had several modifications, but the general characteristics remain unchanged. It is a one-time direct subsidy intended to facilitate access to housing by the poorest households. general all of them follow a similar methodology to rank beneficiaries according to the criteria described in the previous section.
The competition known as Regular was the first scheme created to allocated subsidies to purchase new housing units directly from the market, invest in housing improvement, or build self-help housing. The second scheme put in place was the Territorial Effort, in response to the lack of housing supply in municipalities with populations below 50,000 inhabitants. This subsidy is allocated among housing projects carried out by local governments and is matched by 22 all of which have increased in recent years. Under this scheme, previous savings are not required and the subsidy may be used to finance the purchase of existing homes, rent, self-help housing construction, or home improvement. Currently, the maximum value of the subsidy is equivalent to 25 minimum wages, compared to 22 minimum wages for the rest of the population. 23 The second is the National competition, which promotes priority housing construction in municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants as well as macroprojects, and complements the Regular Subsidy. Third, the Deed Registration competition, which allows de facto tenants of low-income housing located on lands owned by the government to legalize their ownership if they meet certain eligibility criteria.
24 20 The projects with the highest funding offered by the local government obtain higher scores in the competition. Under this scheme, each department has a budget quota and the competition is conducted among applicants from the same department (See the website Under this scheme, the government provides the transfer of ownership and/or partial financing of the cost of registration.
https://sites.google.com/site/socialhousingcolombia/ to obtain the formula used to distribute resources among departments). 21 This subsidy is targeted to families earning less than two minimum monthly wages who apply to buy priority housing (housing worth less than 70 minimum wages). 22 The last two groups were included in 2006. 23 In 2010, 22 and 25 monthly minimum wages were equivalent to COP $11.3 and COP $12.9 million (US$5,963 and US$6,776, respectively). 24 See https://sites.google.com/site/socialhousingcolombia/ for detailed information. 27 Cuellar (2006) and Chiappe (1999) explain how from 1994 to 1997 the housing subsidy focused on improvement projects. According to Chiappe (1999), 38.5 percent of total housing subsidies were allocated to improvement projects. 28 This strategy was implemented to ensure a larger disbursement ratio. 29 Equivalent to US$7, 560. 30 In 2009, the total internally displaced population was 3.3 million (7.0 percent of the country's population). (NGF) to financial intermediaries holding mortgage portfolios. They are previously evaluated according to a risk assessment. A "maximum portfolio value to be guaranteed" (MPV) is assigned to each financial intermediary and, independently, they evaluate and approve guaranteed loans within the limits of the MPV. The guarantee becomes active when the arrear portfolio surpasses 18 months or when the financed housing unit is given as loan payment.
National Guarantee Fund (NGF)
The NGF guarantees the non-payment risk of loans for low-income housing. Loans subject to guarantees should not exceed 108 minimum wages 32 or 80 percent of the housing unit value and should finance housing purchase, improvement, or self-help construction. The guarantee covers up to 70 percent of the expected loss 33 for individual loans with financial intermediaries or up to 50 percent of the outstanding debt for rediscount portfolio. The guarantee covers a period of seven years or less, and its monthly cost is 0.0943 percent plus VAT of the outstanding debt (COP $1,045 for each COP $1 million borrowed); see Table 4 for a detailed description of the mortgage guarantees offered by the Fund.
Programmed Savings
Programmed savings accounts complement the subsidy and facilitate access to credit by signaling payment habits and the ability to pay. From 1991 to 1993, having previous savings was a prerequisite for applying for a housing subsidy. and increase access to credit. The coverage of this scheme is still low (4.7 percent of the total subsidies). However, the outstanding balance of the programmed saving accounts started increasing in 2009, which may be associated with the introduction of this new scheme. Subsidies in this scheme were allocated mainly to families earning between two and three monthly minimum wages (73.2 percent) and 18.1 percent to families earning between three and four minimum wages. The remaining 8.7 percent was allocated to families earning less than one monthly minimum wage.
Housing Subsidies, Housing Finance and Quality of Life
Impact of Subsidies and Credit on Quality of Life
Access to housing credit and housing subsidies is limited in Colombia. According to the most recent national census (2005) (Table 6 ). 
Housing Loan Borrowers and Housing Subsidy Beneficiaries
Most households with access to credit share the following characteristics: they are located in urban 37 areas, they fall within the highest income quintile, and they are headed by a male who has more than 12 years of schooling, works in the informal sector, and is between 35 and 49 years old. Most of the households that benefited from housing subsidies are also located in urban areas and are headed by a male who works in the informal sector and is between 35 and 49 years of age. However, in contrast to those with access to credit, the beneficiaries of the subsidy belong to the lowest income quintiles and their heads of household are less educated (less than 5 years of schooling).
Incidence and Targeting
To analyze access by the poorest families to housing subsidies and mortgages we measured poverty using the Index of Unmet Basic Needs (UBN). targeted households (i.e., households living on more than 4 minimum wages or monthly income above the 7 th decile) were receiving the subsidy.
Quality of Housing Solutions
This section analyzes whether credit and subsidies have improved the quality of housing among the beneficiaries. The effect of housing credit and subsidies on quality of housing is measured by Propensity Score Matching techniques, using as outcome variable an indicator of the quality of housing and two binary treatments: access to housing credit and access to housing subsidy.
The Quality of Dwelling (QoD) index is measured by a Principal Components Analysis (PCA), which includes indicators such as access to potable water, sewerage, electricity, and trash collection services, as well as the construction materials of walls and floors and the availability of an independent room for cooking.
The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) attempts to calculate the impact of the treatment variables by creating a comparison group that would have been affected by treatment variables in a similar fashion to the treated group. The change in the outcome attributable to the subsidy or credit is therefore calculated as the difference in average values of the treated and comparison groups.
The first step to perform PSM is to estimate Logit models in which the dependent variables are treatment dummies (housing subsidy and housing credit). The models are then used to estimate the propensity score of being treated, given a vector of individual characteristics. All the models control for demographic and economic characteristics at the household level. 39 The models also include interaction terms between each variable and region dummies to increase the goodness of fit, but this set of coefficients is not reported. Another criterion used to determine the final correlates for the logit models was the Balancing Hypothesis (or CIA), which states that there should be no statistical difference between treated and non-treated individuals with similar propensity scores in the mean of all the correlates used in the model.
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The second step is the matching based on the propensity score. One approach to match participants and nonparticipants is the Local Linear Matching (LLM), a nonparametric estimator that uses a weighted average of all nonparticipants to construct the counterfactual match for each participant. LLM estimates a nonparametric locally weighted regression of the comparison group outcome, in the neighborhood of each treatment observation (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997) . Under this approach we will match credit borrowers (subsidy beneficiaries) with other households that share similar characteristics but do not have housing loans (subsidies). Once the matching is made we will be able to compute the effect of housing credit (subsidies) on the quality of dwelling index.
To construct the QoD index using the PCA, we take the first principal component since it summarizes the higher proportion of the total variance of the set of variables used in the analysis.
In our case, the first component summarizes 29. Results show a positive and significant ATET in 2003 (Table 8) , which means that housing loans
The features of high-quality buildings are access to utilities, the use of bricks and prefabricated materials for the walls, floors made of marble, parquet, vinyl, or tiles, and having proper places for cooking. Table 7 shows the results of the Quality of Dwelling index (QoD), the outcome variable for the PSM. 39 The control variables include: household head's age, gender, education level, marital status and work status, as well as household size, income, and residence location (urban or rural). 40 If the Balancing Hypothesis is assured, then treated and control observations used in the matching process are very close to one another, at least in the set of observable characteristics used to predict the propensity score. 41 In our case, all variables are discrete. Therefore, the PCA is applied on the basis of a tetra choric correlation matrix that explicitly takes account of the discrete nature of our variables. Hamill (2009) provides evidence on the importance of applying PCA to discrete data by calculating an appropriate correlation matrix to reduce biases in the covariance structure and avoid underestimations of the proportions of the explained variance.
and housing subsidies account for a positive and statistically significant difference in the quality of dwellings 42 between the matched treated (households that had a credit correspond to the first treatment, and households that had housing subsidy to the second treatment) and control groups.
In 2008 we do not observe any effect of housing subsidies on quality of dwelling, although a significant and positive effect on quality of dwelling is observed for households that acquired a house between 2002 and 2007 and used housing loans as a source of funding.
Quality of Life
This section analyses whether credit and subsidies have improved living conditions among the beneficiary population. The effect of housing credit and subsidies on quality of life is quantified by Propensity Score Matching techniques, using as outcome variables a household-level measure of quality of life and two binary treatments: housing credit and housing subsidy access. Table 9 displays the coefficients of each variable for the first principal component. The sign of each coefficient shows the relationship of each variable to the QoL index. All signs are consistent with economic intuition. For example, if the household head is more educated and has access to health services, then the quality of life is positively affected. The index increases with better housing conditions, such as access to utilities, appropriate places for cooking, better wall 42 These are dwellings in the low-income housing group, according to the household income criterion of the lowincome housing program in Colombia. 43 In our case, all variables are discrete. In this case, the PCA is applied on the basis of a tetra choric correlation matrix that explicitly takes account of the discrete nature of our variables. Hamill (2009) provides evidence on the importance of applying PCA to discrete data by calculating an appropriate correlation matrix to reduce biases in the covariance structure and avoid underestimations of the proportions of the explained variance. Considering the QoL poverty threshold, we observe that few loans are made to poor households, whereas housing subsidies are likely to be allocated equally to poor and non-poor households. The results do not change dramatically in 2008 despite the fact that during that year a larger segment of the poor population benefited from housing subsidies (third panel of Figure   5 ).
To determine whether credit and subsidies are improving the living conditions of their beneficiaries, we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM). Housing credit and housing subsidy could be considered treatments, while quality of life is the outcome. To estimate the outcome effect of these treatments, the major concern should be the selection bias created by the rule of selection into treatment. Given our data, we consider that the best empirical strategy is to estimate the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) using PSM. The estimation of the propensity score for treated and non-treated households, based on logit models, follows the same methodology as the one used in Section 5.1.2. Focusing on the local linear regression matching estimations, we find a positive and significant effect on quality of life as shown in Table 10 , with the exception of housing subsidy in 2008. 
Determinants of Access to Housing Subsidies and Housing Loans
Subsidies could facilitate access to a mortgage by low-income households. However, Colombia's housing subsidy program requires a declaration of the amount of money needed to acquire a dwelling before receiving the cash transfer. Since credit is a source of complementary resources, we identify a source of reverse causality between housing subsidies and housing loans, which leads to biased estimators if this is not controlled for.
The Two-Equation Simultaneous System for Access to Low-Income Housing Credit and Access to Housing Subsidy
While a dual relationship may exist between housing credit and housing subsidy, it is likely that access to a housing subsidy plays a more important role in explaining access to housing credit than vice versa, as households are able to prove additional sources of funding other than credit.
We specify the following equations for credit access and subsidy:
where, Credit i * and Subsidy i * are the continuous, latent random variables that represent, respectively, access to housing credit and to a housing subsidy. Within this framework, Credit i * and Subsidy i * are non-observable variables. However, the discrete dependent variables Credit i
and Subsidy i are observable, such that: 45 This index is calculated with PCA using variables of durable goods such as television, refrigerator, washing machine, automobile and computer. The results in the first column of Table 11 show that, after controlling for household and regional characteristics, a housing subsidy significantly increases the likelihood that a household has access to housing credit when the reverse causality is not accounted for. The second column of Table 11 presents the results from the second-stage probit model for the low-income housing credit equation. The results show that access to a subsidy does not increase the likelihood for a household to have access to credit, as was first estimated. Thus, not controlling for this source of endogeneity provides misleading results.
In Table 11 we also observe the first and second stage estimation results of the housing subsidy equation. In particular, we obtain that programmed saving accounts is a significant explanatory variable that increases the probability of access to subsidies once the endogeneity with housing credit has been controlled for (see column 4).
We do not find a significant effect of the probability of having a credit on the probability of having access to a subsidy, despite the design of the program, which in many cases requires having complementary funding. However, this is plausible given that most of the households use their own savings or informal sources of credit to buy their house.
The Two-Equation Simultaneous System for Low-Income Housing Credit Access and Housing Subsidy Access Using a Private Bank Dataset
The effect of access to subsidy on access to housing credit is also estimated using data from a Colombian private mortgage bank (one of the most important in the mortgage market). The dataset has 33,689 housing loans, out of which 71.09 percent are low-income housing loans.
About 54 percent of mortgage borrowers are households belonging to the 1 st and 2 nd income quintiles. 11.27 percent of the low-income housing loans are subsidized, and around 78 percent of borrowers who had a subsidy belong to the 1st and 2nd income quintiles.
The effect of access to a subsidy on access to low-income housing credit is estimated using the two-stage Maddala estimation procedure. Results displayed in the first two columns of Table 12 show a positive and significant effect of housing subsidy on housing credit, as well as variables such as the type of job contract (temporary workers are more likely to have access to credit than retired people) and using the loan to acquire a new house rather than a pre-existing one. The higher probability of having a housing subsidy positively affects the probability of access to housing loans in this bank. In particular, for low values of housing solutions, the subsidy might represent a considerable amount of such housing, values which in turn reduces the amount of money lent to low-income people.
The credit score is the variable excluded from the subsidy equation. A higher credit score is related to a lower probability of default. It is observable by the bank and it is taken into consideration when approving a loan. The credit score has no relation to the allocation of subsidies. Additionally, we should account for some economic characteristics of low-income housing borrowers. These individuals usually have limited access to financial services and do not have credit histories. However, despite not having the best credit scores, they are likely to gain access to credit because of the availability of instruments such as the loan guarantee provided by the National Guarantee Fund.
The probit model results in Table 12 also show that after controlling for the reverse causality with housing credit, the probability of having a credit does not affect the probability of having access to a subsidy. However, as was to be expected, people belonging to the lowest income strata are gaining access to the subsidy.
Housing Loan Guarantee Policy
The Colombian government aims to help low-income households obtain affordable housing through a guaranteed mortgage loan program available through financial intermediaries. The National Guarantee Fund 46 (NGF) guarantees the non-payment risk of low-income housing loans. The guarantee covers up to 70 percent of the expected loss. These guarantees are provided to financial intermediaries holding a mortgage portfolio, but the final beneficiaries are the borrowers. percent, respectively. The average Loan-To-Value (LTV, a ratio of the amount of a first mortgage to the total appraised value of real property) also differs across intermediaries. As shown in the left panel of Figure 6 , the National Savings Fund lent, on average, at higher LTV ratios than Banks and Family Welfare Agencies and, therefore, assumes a higher risk of default.
Analysis of Implementation of the Guarantee Program
The figure's right panel shows that the National Savings Fund is also providing the longest-term guaranteed loans (average duration of 15 years) followed by banks (average duration of 13 years), Family Welfare Agencies (10 years) and cooperatives (9 years). 46 The National Guarantee Fund (Fondo Nacional de Garantías), supervised by the Financial Superintendency, was created in 1982 as a mixed-economy entity to provide partial credit guarantees. Its stakeholders are the Ministry of Finance (60 percent), the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism (20 percent), Bancoldex (12 percent), Findeter (7.2 percent) and the SMEs Union (ACOPI ) (0.8 percent). Going further on the Intermediary 5 dataset, we also estimate a probit model to identify those features that make an applicant more likely to have an NGF loan guarantee. Results in Table 13 show that a high credit score Finally, the probability of having a guaranteed loan is lower as the household's income increases. 47 The credit score is a score calculated by private banks based on some of the socio-economic characteristics of housing loan applicants. However, we do not have access to the information used in the calculation of this variable.
The regional coverage of the program reflects the limited access to financing in nonurban areas of the country. Additionally, not many non-bank intermediaries, such as cooperatives, which have a larger presence in rural areas and low income segments, participate in the program. This might be also the result of different strategies followed by each region to promote the program. Finally, despite the obvious benefit from guarantees, some financial intermediaries do not make use of them. This may be related to the operational procedures required to participate in the program and to specific policies followed by each intermediary in their selection of borrowers.
Credit Performance of Guaranteed Loans
From 2006 to 2009, four financial institutions, which were among the biggest mortgage banks in Colombia, granted 69.3 percent of the total guaranteed loans. The performance of these loans differed among institutions. The second most important lender of guaranteed low-income housing loans (by size of its guaranteed loans disbursements) had 48 percent of the system's guaranteed low-income housing portfolio in default. One plausible explanation for this has to do with the beneficiary selection criteria used by this lender. It is possible that this lender only offered guaranteed loans to bad payers. However, the lack of data prevents us from doing a proper assessment of this statement. As mentioned in the previous section, the NGF program is concentrated in the capital and two departments in the country. Therefore, these regions account for almost 80 percent of the total defaulted loans.
We also used the Intermediary 5 database to analyze the explanatory factors of the default probability in housing loans. We ran two regressions: one for each type of housing loans and only for low-income housing loans. In the first case the odds of default increased when the housing loan was a low-income housing loan, when borrowers have lower levels of education, and when households have a larger number of dependents. However, when the loan is used to acquire a new house, a lower probability of default is estimated. It is possible that buyers of new housing are more averse to losing their homes, make a greater effort to preserve these assets, and are more committed to repaying their loans (see column 1 of Table 14 ). When we run the regression only for the sample of low-income housing loans we find similar results. Borrowers with characteristics such as having secondary education (as compared to higher education), having more dependent household members, and higher income are more likely to default (see column 2 of Table 14) .
We also estimated the probability of default when the loan is guaranteed by the NGF. In the second column of Table 14 , we observe that guaranteed loans are more likely to default than those which are not guaranteed. This is an interesting result as it suggests the loan guarantees schemes are not devoid of moral hazard and adverse selection problems. We also observe that using mortgages to buy new housing reduces the odds of default, as compared to using them to buy pre-existing housing.
Estimation of the Impact of Loan Guarantees on Access to Housing Credit
There are some limitations when assessing the impact of the NGF program on access to housing credit, such as the lack of data to build an appropriate control group and to identify those factors that determine the selection of beneficiaries by the financial intermediary. However, it is still possible to evaluate the effect of having loan guarantees on the number of new housing credits. Given our data restrictions, we follow Cárdenas and Rozo (2007) , who suggest evaluating the program taking into consideration its operation at different points in time. The NGF program was applied in each municipality at different points during the period of study, so we are able to estimate the effect of the program as the coefficient of a dummy variable with a value of one, from the year when the program started operations in each municipality and on. The municipalities in our sample are also comparable in terms of size (regional GDP), labor market variables (regional employment and unemployment rates), and financial variables (size of regional mortgages and regional access to financial services as a proportion of savings accounts).
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The effect of housing loan guarantees is estimated with a panel approach at municipalitylevel for the period 2006-2008: where, i denotes city and t year, Y it is the number of disbursed loans by city per year; T t is the year fixed effect; P r is the regional fixed effect; M m is the municipal fixed effect; NFG it is a dummy variable =1 from the year the NGF started operations in certain municipality and 0 otherwise; and W it are control variables (regional per capita GDP, regional unemployment rate, and access to financial services in the region).
The estimation results are displayed in Table 15 . We did not find a significant effect of the NGF program on the number of housing loans. One plausible explanation is the limited scope of the program, as described in Section 6.1.
Conclusions
This paper presented the results of a study of the characteristics and evolution of low-income 
the subsidy. Households from the first decile (poorest people) have a lower participation in the subsidy than households from the third decile. This may be related to the fact that the poorest families face considerable difficulties in accessing complementary funding, and the scope of the subsidy programs that do not require this type of funding is limited. Additionally our data suggest problems in the design and execution in the subsidy, because some of its beneficiaries belong to high-income deciles (seventh and ninth deciles).
The propensity score matching estimators show that, in 2003, housing credit and subsidies had a positive impact on the quality of housing solutions and the quality of life. Results from 2008 were not significant because the available data was not suitable to design a proper control group.
According to the estimation of the simultaneous model, using the 2003 Quality of Life Survey, having assets that can serve as collateral strongly increases the probability of obtaining housing credit. This probability is also positively affected by having a programmed savings account. The estimation of this simultaneous model using the private bank dataset showed that access to low-income housing credit is negatively affected by the borrower's income level and positively affected by the household's size and by having a housing subsidy. The probability of having access to housing subsidies is not affected by having access to housing credits, even though the opposite is significant and positive.
Regarding loan guarantees from the NGF, we found that the program is focused on backing low-income housing credits, easing access to loans. However, credits backed with guarantees from the NGF are more prone to be in default, suggesting moral hazard and adverse selection problems. We did not find evidence of any effect of the NGF program on access to credit, which may be related to the fact that the coverage of the program is very limited. Coefficient significant at ***1% level, ** 5% level, *10% level Coefficient significant at ***1% level, ** 5% level, *10% level 
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